The Crimes of Khrushchev: Hungary

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“We will put in more troops and more troops and more troops until we have finished them.”
— Nikita Khrushchev’s response to a question by a former U.S. Ambassador on the slaughter in Hungary.

The following consultations with Gen. Bela Kiraly and Joseph Kovago, respectively, were held at 10 a.m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, presiding. Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director; George C. Williams, investigator.

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The Chairman. The committee will come to order and the first witness will be sworn.

Do you, General Kiraly, solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General Kiraly. I do.

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Arens.

Statement of Gen. Bela Kiraly

Mr. Arens. Kindly identify yourself by name, residence, and occupation.

General Kiraly. My name is Bela Kiraly; my residence is 310 Riverside Drive, New York 25, New York; and at present I am a member of the Hungarian Committee and the executive co-president of Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation, Inc.

Mr. Arens. How long have you been a resident of the United States, please, sir?

General Kiraly. I arrived here on December 15, 1956, and since that time I have been a resident of the United States.

Mr. Arens. General, would you kindly give us a brief, personal sketch of your life: where and when you were born, a word about your education, and then, if you please, sir, just the highlights of your career?

General Kiraly. I was born in Kaposvar in Hungary, 1912. I graduated from high school in the same city. Then I was a student at the Hungarian Military Academy, where I graduated in 1935.

Then I served in different posts in the Hungarian army, graduated from the Commanding General Staff College, and was a general staff officer of the Hungarian army.

I participated in World War II in the Hungarian army, and, after World War II, I served again in the new democratic army.

I was a member of the Communist Party of Hungary.

I became a general and commander of the Hungarian General Staff College; and from that post I was arrested in 1951, condemned to death, and after five years of imprisonment, in September 1956 I was released on parole.

A month later the Hungarian revolution broke out, during which I was elected commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Hungary and Budapest military garrison.

In the second part of November I had to escape from Hungary; via Vienna I came to the United States.

Mr. Arens. Now, sir, would you recount in your own words the highlights of the Hungarian revolution, concerning which much has been written and much has been said, but the lessons of which some people seem to be disposed to ignore?

General Kiraly. Yes. The Hungarian revolution, in its essence, was a spontaneous nationwide uprising with two basic aims. The first basic aim of it was to abolish the Communist one-party dictatorship, the Communist social and economic order, and to establish a new democratic and economic system, parliamentary government, based on a general secret election.

The second basic aim of the Hungarian revolution was to get rid of the Soviet colonial rule and to establish the nation’s independence.

These two basic aims were accepted by the whole nation, and the whole nation wanted to achieve these goals by the utmost sacrifice.

The Hungarian revolution, however, did not break out from one day to the other. Before the revolution there was a long period during which a so-called reform movement tried to elaborate a reform program for the above-mentioned two basic aims; and this reform movement aimed to achieve those goals by peaceful means.

Until October the 23rd, 1956, this reform movement developed; and on the 23rd of October, in the form of a huge demonstration in Budapest, the people of Budapest announced their strong will to achieve these two basic aims—but I want to accentuate again— through peaceful means.

On that day the Communist Party leadership in Budapest found out that the Communist Party had only two alternatives: Either to let this reform movement progress further—in that case the Communist Party would have been obliged to make basic concessions to this reform movement—or the second alternative, to use the forces which were at the disposal of the Communist Party to suppress this reform movement and reestablish the former one-party dictatorship and the authority of the Communist Party.

The Muscovite party leadership decided upon the second. They decided to use force against this reform movement to hinder the further development and to suppress this reform movement.

For that aim the party secretary, Mr. Gero, ordered the secret police to use their arms against the demonstrators; and it was the turning point of the events.

It was a turning point where the peaceful reform movement was turned into a revolution. The first major action of the revolution was the toppling down of the huge statue of Stalin, which was the symbol of Soviet domination. The freedom fighters hoisted the Hungarian flag, decorated with the ancient coat-of-arms of free Hungary, upon the remnant of the Stalin statue.

Mr. Arens. May I interrupt you here please, General, to ask you a few questions.

As of the time of the outbreak of the revolution in the form of violence, how many people or what percentage of the people of Hungary were actually members of the Communist Party?

General Kiraly. At the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution members of the Communist Party were near to one million. That means that one out of every ten of the inhabitants was a member of the Communist Party.

It proves, on the other hand, that to belong to the Communist Party did not mean that one was a Communist too. Again the fact that during the revolution many people with Communist Party affiliation fought against the Communist dictatorship, showed that really adherence to the Communist Party did not mean that one was indeed a convinced Communist.

Mr. Arens. Could you tell us, General, if you know, what was the membership of the Communist Party in Hungary at the time of the takeover by the Communists?

General Kiraly. When the Communists took over? I believe it is much better to tell that after World War II. I believe it is more correct.

Mr. Arens. All right, sir.

General Kiraly. After World War II the Communist Party consisted of a handful of people who came back from the Soviet Union as Soviet citizens, and I do not believe that the underground Communist Party which acted in Hungary during World War II was more than a couple of hundred.

Mr. Arens. What percentage of the members of the Communist Party in Hungary at the time of the revolution were dedicated Communists?

General Kiraly. The number of the dedicated Communists in 1945 I do not guess was multiplied very much. Really there were some idealistic persons who believed that perhaps the Communist ideology, the Communist Party, and social system would be able to help the nation to be rebuilt from the ruins which the nation suffered during World War II.

But many of these idealists were disillusioned and many, many of them had been arrested. A handful of former Communists, for example, who returned from the West from exile, who were Communists in France and other Western countries and returned to Hungary to cooperate with those who came from Moscow, were, almost without exception, arrested because the Khrushchevian party leadership from Moscow did not trust any but those who were in Moscow for these twenty years between the two world wars.

They were willing to put in key positions only those who returned from Moscow and were Soviet citizens and knew all the background activities of the Communist Party, the terrors and so on, and who did not dare to make the least diversion from the Muscovite line. In those Khrushchev could trust so much as in himself. If he gave any order, he could be positive that they would carry it out.

Mr. Arens. Now, General, please tell us how you account for the one million members of the Communist Party in Hungary, as distinct from the relatively small hard core of dedicated Communists.

General Kiraly. Many, many factors obliged persons to join the Communist Party. The first was some sort of opportunism, because the Communist Party, even before the time when they took over by the help of the Soviet occupation authorities, was in the position to decide who should serve in that and that and that key position. Even before the takeover, the Communist Party could decide who will work where.

Consequently one factor was opportunism, to have the Communist support to get good jobs at the time.

Number two: The Communist Party mostly before the takeover had to play some political games against the democratic parties. Therefore, the Communist Party needed masses in the party to show itself as the strongest party, and consequently the Communist Party not only gave concessions to its members, but pressed people to join the party in order to have high numbers in the party.

Therefore, for example, the Communist Party was the only party which accepted definitely Fascists into its membership. The other parties could not afford, and did not want, to accept Fascists; the Communist Party could; and a Fascist, even if he committed war crimes during the war, could have asylum inside the Communist Party. That was the second thing.

The third thing: Many people were joining the Communist Party because of fear, because to be a party member did mean, in some respects, a defense against the atrocities of the secret police and other terror organizations.

Many people wanted nothing else but not to be disturbed. Having the Communist Party membership card, at least they were not disturbed by authorities, by the tax office, and so on ana so on.

So the Communist Party membership meant more or less greater security than not belonging to the Communist Party.

If I may I would show my own example.

Mr. Arens. If you will, please, sir.

General Kiraly. I joined some sort of resistance activities against the Nazis, and I myself went over to the Russian side because they were the only so-called liberators in Hungary; and with many soldiers, I went over and I offered to fight against the Nazis.

For two or three days we were cheered by the Soviets as allies, so to say. But when the front line was far enough to hinder us to make any disturbances to the Soviet units, to the Soviet soldiers, we were disarmed and declared prisoners of war and were being brought to the Soviet Union.

When we were very near to the Rumanian-Soviet frontier, with a group I escaped from the train which was intending to take us—who wanted to fight against the Nazis, who wanted to fight with the Soviets as long as Hungary will be free—we faced the danger to be brought to the Soviet Union.

And then we escaped. We managed to escape from the train very near the Soviet frontier.

We returned to Hungary, and there I got in touch with high-ranking officers who investigated everybody’s activities during the war.

Without some sort of investigation nobody could join the new army. There a general told me that—

if you escaped from the Soviet prison camp, you will be found here by Soviet patrols, so it is definitely positive that you will be taken back and nobody knows when you will return to Hungary.

You have only three alternatives: Either you will escape to the West where the Western troops are, into Austria or into Germany; or you will go underground in Hungary and wait until the Soviets will withdraw from Hungary; or you have to join the Communist Party. In that case, even having escaped from Soviet prison camp, it does not make any harm to you.

I was positive that I could do a lot of good for my nation, and I joined the party and joined the army.

So when I first met a Soviet officer from the Russian Occupation Commission in Hungary, he said: “I know very well that you escaped from the prison camp, but it does not mean anything.”

So it was the only possibility to remain there. If I had not, I would have been brought back to Russia.

So in the everyday life, a Communist Party member’s security was a little bit greater until the takeover in 1949 when the Communists seized power. They knew that a great number of the party members were not trustworthy for the Kremlin and for the party, and to intimidate their own party membership they made big purges even among the Communists.

It was one of the most important factors in the rule, the continuous intimidation of the nation, individuals, including the Communist Party members too.

Mr. Arens. Was that the time when you were purged from the party?

General Kiraly. My purge was not a party purge; my purge was a personal matter because in 1951, when the Korean war was going on and the big tension existed between Yugoslavia and the Conununist bloc and in this tension Hungary was selected to be the most embittered competitor of Tito, then many frontier clashes and disturbances occurred and even there was a possibility that at least perhaps a limited war would break out between Yugoslavia and Hungary.

Therefore, the army was purged of everybody who was not trustworthy for the party. 1951–52 were the two years when there was not definitely a party purge, but an army purge, during which period of time they made the army completely servile and trustworthy for the party.

Mr. Arens. Now may I inquire, before we get to the actual shooting in the revolution itself, if you have information respecting the techniques of the takeover of Hungary by the relatively few Communists?

General Kiraly. Yes. Of course this would be a much more proper question for Mr. Kovago, who was a politician and knew these matters well.

Mr. Arens. We shall ask him aboutit, too, later on.

General Kiraly. I was at the time in the army and, though not a politician, I, as everybody, could see which were the most important developments in the takeover. The basis of the takeover was not a Hungarian internal force or internal action; the basis of the takeover was the presence of the Soviet Control Commission in Hungary which until the coming in force of the peace treaty in September 1947 was the real control power in Hungary.

No man in the army or in the administration could be appointed to a responsible position without the approval of the Soviet Control Commission. Consequently until 1947, autumn, the takeover went on step by step in the background by putting persons in the key positions, such sorts of persons whom the Communist Party trusted.

What the political side of the takeover is, the most important steps and factors are the following:

In 1945, in the fall, there was an election in Hungary. During this election the Communist Party polled only 17 percent of all the votes; consequently the Smallholders’ Party, which polled the majority of all the votes, would have been in a position to form a one-party government because they had an absolute majority in the Parliament of Hungary; however, again the Control Commission forced the Smallholders’ Party to form a coalition government, including the Communist Party and the Social Democrat Party and the National Peasant Party.

Now the second step was to begin to cut off from the majority party, from the Smallholders’ Party, those persons and groups who were the most outspoken anti-Communists. So that the main anti-Communist party, the Smallholders’ Party, was pressed to exclude from the party persons and groups that were the backbone of the anti-Communist policy.

After 1947, in the autumn, when the Control Commission had been abolished because the peace treaty was in force, the Communist Party was in a position from which they controlled the most important positions in the state administration.

Even more important, the secret police was by that time so well organized that it controlled all sectors of the administration and the every-day life in Hungary. So when the Control Commission was no longer in power in Hungary, the secret police was everywhere and could arrest whomever they wanted.

From that time on the rigid cruelty became even more definite a factor than before.

Again there was another factor in Hungary. The Soviet occupation force existed in Hungary, so that everybody saw the Soviet soldiers there and everybody knew that if any thought of action which would not suit the Communist Party and their Kremlin bosses, the Soviet army would have been used for suppressing any such activities.

So these forces—key persons in key positions, secret police, the presence of the Soviet army, and the suppression of the most anti-Communist party, the Smallholders’ Party—made the Communists capable of making an open takeover which was carried out between 1947 and 1948.

During this period the Communist Party managed fully to control the country, and in the year of 1948 they openly announced the Communist takeover.

In 1949 they made a new type, a Communist-type, election in Hungary. In this election—I don’t exactly know—about 97 percent of the population “voted” for the one-party list.

On August 20, 1949, the Communist Party was already in position to declare the so-called people’s democracy, which is the form of bolshevism in Hungary, led of course by the Kremlin and by the local Communist agents.

Mr. Arens. Now, sir, during the actual revolution, what post or posts did you occupy in Hungary?

General Kiraly. During the revolution I acted in three posts. Two of them were elected posts. I was elected to be the chairman of the revolutionary Home Defense Committee. The task of this committee was to control all the armed forces of the country.

The second post was also an elected post. I was elected to be the commander-in-chief of the National Guard, which was a new armed force, which was the armed force of the freedom fighters.

Third, by the Nagy government, the revolutionary government, I was appointed to be the military commander of the Budapest garrison, which was not an elected but an appointed position, over the armed forces being concentrated in the Budapest area.

Mr. Arens. Now will you kindly, in your own words, detail the principal events of the revolution until it was completely over.

General Kiraly. Yes. As I previously stated, on October 23rd, 1956, a peaceful demonstration was transformed into a bloody revolution by the opening of fire of the secret police.

Fire was very soon opened by the freedom fighters, too, when they were able to capture some units of the secret police who approached the building of the Radio of Budapest, from which the secret police units opened fire against the freedom fighters.

When they—the freedom fighters—managed to capture and disarm some of the reinforcements of the secret police, by the very weapons of the secret police the freedom fighters returned the fire of the secret police.

The second most important step in the revolution was that the government ordered an army unit, a whole regiment, on the spot to help the secret police to disperse the demonstrators who were at the time already revolutionary fighters.

It was a characteristic event. The regiment was under the control of the Soviet advisers under the control of the secret police agents in the army. It was led by young officers, all of them having been workers’ and peasants’ children. This regiment under such control and under the leadership of officers of worker and peasant origin and under the leadership which, in the majority, consisted of officers with Communist Party membership, this regiment refused to carry out the orders of the Kremlin-led Communist dictators of Hungary, and some of the soldiers joined the freedom fighters; some of the soldiers offered their weapons to the freedom fighters and dispersed and went home.

Some dispersed with their own weapons, but none of the soldiers were willing to carry out the Muscovite order to shoot against their own compatriots.

Then the third step was the intervention of the Soviet armed forces in Hungary, and it was the first violation of the independence of Hungary. The United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, the United Nations General Assembly, an organization of international lawyers, and many other prominent international bodies investigated the case and stated that the Soviet Union, even on the basis of the Warsaw Pact, had no right at all to interfere in Hungary’s internal matters by their armed forces stationed in Hungary.

Anyway, the third step was interference of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.

Then the matter is very, very characteristic how they behaved. These interfering Soviet armed forces did not carry out even a regular street fight, fighting only freedom-fighter groups. They carried out a terror attack against Budapest with artillery and tanks. They would shoot against a single moving person on the street, against homes, against churches, against apartment houses, without any discrimination.

This whole Soviet intervention was characteristic of what the Soviet Union does in places they occupy. Their attack was a terror action. By shooting against the peaceful population and against apartment buildings, they intended to intimidate the country and to disillusion them of the revolution.

However, the result of the battle which began between the invading Soviet forces and the freedom fighters, reinforced by several Hungarian army units which joined the freedom fighters, was a success of the Hungarians. During a five-day battle the Soviet troops (approximately two armored divisions) were defeated by the Hungarian freedom fighters in Budapest.

Many hundred Soviet tanks were burned out. Many Soviet soldiers were killed; of course Hungarian freedom fighters also. Children and women on the streets were killed by the Soviet invaders.

But after five days of battle, the Soviet leadership found out that they lost the battle. To avoid the annihilation of the Soviet units, Khrushchev himself carried out one of his most sinister actions.

He sent to Budapest his first deputy, Mikoyan; and he sent Mr. Suslov from the party leadership. These two Soviet men sat down with the revolutionary government. They found out that they were defeated. After talking with Khrushchev by means of the telephone—and by the approval of Khrushchev—they concluded an armistice with the Hungarian Government on the 29th of October in the Parliament Building of Budapest.

After this valid and legal armistice, concluded by the duly credentialed Soviet delegates and the Hungarian Government, the Hungarian Government let the Soviet troops withdraw from Budapest. The order was reestablished in Budapest. Freedom fighters patrolled the streets; the population was jubilant.

Diplomatic actions were further developed on the 2nd of November. The Soviet Government gave a proposal to Hungary to continue the negotiation. In the first note of the Soviet Government, it was positively declared that the aim of the further diplomatic negotiation is the decision how to withdraw the Soviet troops from Hungary and how to allow Hungary to regain her national independence.

I myself participated partly in this development on November 2nd. I myself was, on the order of Prime Minister Imre Nagy, in the office of the Soviet ambassador, Andropov. Andropov announced to me that “We [the Soviet Government and the Soviet people] have nothing in our minds against the Hungarian people. We sympathize with you. And I am ordered by the Soviet Government to propose further negotiations with the Hungarian Government concerning the details of the withdrawals of the Soviet troops.”

And he asked me to call from his own office our Prime Minister Imre Nagy to find out the decision of the Hungarian Government.

This I did, and immediately by word I informed Mr. Andropov that the Hungarian Government is ready to negotiate.

And then, again by the order of Khrushchev himself, the most sinister diplomatic activity and negotiation began. We used to call this whole action a second “day of infamy.” We believe that was the right name, because after our government accepted the Soviet proposal, again a duly credentialed Soviet delegation appeared in the Hungarian Parliament, consisting of high-ranking Soviet officers, generals.

They sat down with the duly credentialed Hungarian delegation, in which two ministers, Minister of Defense Pal Maleter and Minister of State Erdei, and some experts participated.

The definite aim of these negotiations was to decide the technical details of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

These negotiations began on November 3rd, about noontime, and lasted until about six o’clock in the afternoon. This testimony of mine is again—I believe—very important because very few people escaped or survived of those who were informed about this sinister fraud of the Soviet Union, of Khrushchev.

At six o’clock on November 3rd I talked to the chief of staff of the Hungarian army, General Kovacs, who also was a member of this committee. General Kovacs stated to me that, “There is a full agreement between the Soviet delegation and the Hungarian delegation on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, and the last day until the Soviet troops have to leave Hungary is January 15.”

We were told that in the night the Hungarian delegation will go to the Soviet headquarters in Tököl, a village south of Budapest. The aim to go to the Soviet headquarters was announced to be the ceremonial signing of the final text of the agreement. There was only one question open—the Hungarian delegation wanted as the last day of the Soviet withdrawal December 15th, and the Soviet wanted January 15th.

It was the only open question, and the Hungarian Government made the decision that if the Soviet insisted on having January 15 as the last day, they would agree.

The Hungarian delegation entered the Soviet headquarters with good faith, intending to sign the final text of Soviet-Hungarian agreement which already was agreed upon in the Hungarian Parliament.

Then indeed a dramatic event occurred. It was the second “day of infamy” of modern history. The Hungarian delegation continued their negotiations on the spot—Even we had some telephone calls back. It could be supposed that the negotiations began as real diplomatic negotiations.

About midnight General Serov entered the room and, no doubt on the order of Khrushchev, arrested the Hungarian delegation. Serov, as the chief of the secret police, was directly under the order of the first secretary of the Communist Party, which means that Serov was a direct subordinate of Khrushchev. He could not carry out any major action without Khrushchev’s direct order. I mean on the basis of my experience in the Communist-ruled country, the arrest of a diplomatic delegation by the secret police chief could only be carried out by the direct order of the first secretary of the party, who was Khrushchev.

Consequently, these shameful arrests could only be taken as an action of Khrushchev, for which he, in his own person, is alone responsible.

Mr. Arens. What did he do? What did Serov do?

General Kiraly. Serov arrested Maleter, Erdei, and all the members of the Hungarian delegation. And from that point they disappeared, we do not know what happened; but we both, Mr. Kovago and I, were under treatment of the secret police and can imagine what happened with these persons.

They have been imprisoned, they have been brainwashed, they have had to go through all the terrors of the secret police which we all went through, except the Communist fellow travelers like Erdei, who was later released.

After that some of the delegation, more important the Home Defense Minister, one of the heads of this diplomatic delegation, was executed in Hungary in 1958. The circumstances of the execution show again how the Kremlin—that is, how Khrushchev—is controlling foreign countries like Hungary under their colonial rule.

If the time is proper and I am allowed, I will be able to tell details of the trial and the execution.

Mr. Arens. You have told us now what happened during the incident of the arrest of the Hungarian delegation and the disappearance of the official credentialed delegates. Now continue with your theme, if you please, sir, in the chronology of events.

General Kiraly. Yes.

Mr. Arens. Excuse me just a moment please, sir. Where were you at the time of the arrest of the Hungarian delegation?

General Kiraly. I was in the headquarters of the National Guard of Hungary in Budapest. It was in the middle of Budapest in a big building. It was previously the headquarters of the police chief of Budapest. From that place we had direct contact with the Parliament, which was the seat of revolutionary government. I had a personal telephone contact with Prime Minister Imre Nagy. We could call each other without any operator in between us. As the things developed on November 4th, I was in direct connection with Premier Imre Nagy, and all the details of events were always reported to him in two or three minutes.

Near midnight our connection with General Maleter was cut. I mean there was no more answer on the telephone on which we could call him before at the Soviet headquarters. I immediately informed the premier that something was wrong; until now we were able to call the Hungarian delegation and to get in connection with them, now we could not.

Then we sent an officer-led detachment to the Soviet headquarters with tanks which crossed the Danube—the Soviet headquarters was on an island. Our detachment crossed the Danube on a secret ferry which we had. We were in radio communication with this detachment.

Minute to minute they reported: “We are crossing the Danube.” “We are approaching Tököl.” “We see the building of the Russian headquarters.”

And then all further communication was cut. The detachment, with good faith, jumped out of the tanks, and all of them disappeared. We do not know anything about them since that time on.

Then alarming reports began to pour in from different parts of Hungary. The first came from Kiskunhalas. The reports described how the Soviet troops attacked the military barracks without warning. Without warning they began to shoot at the barracks and made a blood bath there and occupied the barracks.

The second report came from Kecskemet, another big city in the Hungarian great plain, telling the same. Time after time I reported to the prime minister what was going on; that the Soviet troops were attacking.

The prime minister told me: “I forbid you to give any order to open fire because the Soviet ambassador [the above-mentioned Andropov] is with me and he is telling that something is wrong, some misunderstanding has happened, and he just wants to call Khrushchev himself in Moscow to clear the situation, because something is wrong. Nobody gave orders to the Soviet troops, he insisted.”

So I believe that Khrushchev decided to sacrifice Andropov, if needed, when sending him to the Hungarian Parliament to pretend that the whole thing was a misunderstanding and they wanted—with good faith—to carry out what they had agreed to earlier on that day.

“I forbid you to make any military arrangements. Something is wrong, and Andropov will talk with Moscow, with Khrushchev himself, and everything will be all right,” Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of Hungary, concluded.

I do not want to go into further details here. The same things happened all over Hungary what I told above. In the eastern and central part of Hungary, the Soviet troops invaded us from Czechoslovakia, from Russia and from Rumania.

From city to city the freedom fighters reported to us the details of the aggression. We had very good connections with freedom fighters in the country and cities. In the meantime the city of Budapest itself was reached and attacked by the Soviet forces.

I reported to the prime minister that we have a very thin defensive line in the city; if we do not open fire immediately this very thin defense will be broken through, then we cannot do anything.

I asked him that either he himself or I myself—as in the absence of the Home Defense Minister I was the highest-ranking general in the armv since the revolutionary government rehabilitated me and gave me back my rank of which I was bereft during the court martial—should go on the radio and make an announcement that there is a Soviet aggression and that everybody everywhere would have to defend the place where he is. I feared that some defense objects would be broken through if we did not give orders immediately.

The connections in Budapest were not very perfect, and the military arrangements were not too much developed because many Soviet-loyal generals and staff officers were yet in the army who made disturbances in the leadership.

The only means, according to my opinion, at that time seemed to be a radio announcement that we were being attacked and we had to defend the city and everybody was ordered to defend the place where he was. Unfortunately the typical Khrushchevian fraud with Andropov having been in the Parliament made such a great influence on Prime Minister Imre Nagy that he forbade every sort of general announcement on the radio or any other way. He told me:

You are forbidden to issue any sort of military order because if you order the opening of fire, it means war.

As long as by accident troops are shooting at each other it is an accident and it could be smoothed out; but if you, as a responsible leader of the army, announce an opening of fire through radio or any other implement it will mean war.

To decide war—as you know—is not a military task but a government responsibility. We do not want to make war on the Soviet Union.

Very soon, of course, our thin defensive line was broken through, and the Russian tank units invaded Budapest.

Mr. Arens. What units attacked at that point? Were they all Russian troops or were there some non-Russian troops?

General Kiraly. Sir, number one: The new invading force were new troops brought from Russia and other parts of the Soviet orbit. The new aggressors were not those troops stationed in Hungary before the revolution, some of which had been defeated by us. The new attack was launched by brand new troops with a very high number of tanks and with a very heavy concentration against Budapest. That is the military part of it.

What your question is concerned with, sir: a very high number of the invading troops of soldiers consisted of Mongolian and other Asiatic races.

May I continue?

Mr. Arens. If you please, sir.

General Kiraly. Then between about two and three o’clock—I do not know the precise hour, we did not see a watch at the time—my own headquarters was approached by a Soviet tank column.

I immediately called the prime minister and reported that we were about to be attacked. From my position I was able to watch the approaching Soviet tanks and I, so to say, counted them off to the prime minister.

I said the point where they were turning to us and I counted them, and I had reached about twenty or so numbers, but we were very lucky. This tank unit did not attack our headquarters, which had no tank defense, of course. Consequently it would have suffered tremendously. We would only have been able to fight by means of hand grenades and “Molotov cocktails,” but they made a turn and began to go in a direction where the Parliament itself lay.

I reported to the prime minister: “We are not attacked, but the tank column is going toward the Parliament, toward your own headquarters.”

Then the prime minister told me: “Thank you. I do not want any further reports.” And then he went to the microphone and made his historical announcement.

In my own words it was: “Today at daybreak Soviet troops attacked our capital with the obvious intention to overthrow the legal government. Our troops are in fighting. I am informing the nation and the world of this fact.”

Almost word for word this was his last announcement. In the last minute when he himself saw with his own naked eyes the invading tanks he realized that we, like it or not, were in a war. In this announcement the prime minister really did not make a declaration of war, but registered the fact that we were invaded and we were in a war.

To see, like in Vinnitsa people saw hundreds of corpses, those who were killed by Khrushchev’s mercenaries and some perhaps personally by Khrushchev is a very dramatic and very tragic scene. However, I cannot compare any of these even dramatic killings with the sort of diplomatic treachery personally made by Khrushchev. Mikoyan and Suslov—when negotating in Budapest—were in close connection with Khrushchev, ana on November 4th Mr. Andropov also was in telephone connection with him. Consequently day-to-day arrangements, hour-to-hour orders, how to carry out the shameful diplomatic fraud were given by Khrushchev himself.

I believe that one of the most dramatic and most important crimes that ever has been committed in modern times was that diplomatic treachery in Budapest and it was hour to hour carried out by Khrushchev himself. November 4, 1956, the beginning of the second Soviet aggression and the arrest of General Pal Maleter and the Hungarian diplomatic delegation, is the second “day of infamy” of modern history.

Mr. Arens. General, based upon your intimate knowledge of the Hungarian people, what, in your opinion, will be the impact upon the Hungarian people when they read in the press about Khrushchev’s visit to the United States and his reception here, where he will be wined and dined by our officialdom, including the White House itself?

General Kiraly. Sir, I only can quote two small examples of what happened in Hungary when Khrushchev was there. Hungary is until now occupied by one hundred thousand Soviet soldiers. Compared with the Hungarian population, which is more than nine million, each one hundred Hungarians are watched by one Russian soldier.

It means that Hungary today is a nation-wide prison, imprisoned by Khrushchev’s army units. Under the shadow of this one hundred thousand Russian bayonets when in 1958—one and a half years after the Hungarian revolution—Khrushchev visited Budapest, the following reception was given to him:

When he landed in the airport of Budapest the government did not even dare to send a military honor guard to receive Khrushchev, the prime minister of the Soviet Union. They sent there a secret police honor guard. It has not occurred in recent times that a prime minister of a great power could not be received by military units but a secret police unit. I believe it is one of the greatest humiliations which ever occurred to a prime minister of a great power.

Number two: He went on a sightseeing tour like he will go here, and I want to quote two events, both of which I can prove with Budapest newspapers, with Communist newspapers.

It occurred in 1958, April to be very precise. He went to Szolnok—it is a peasant area—where in the whole district the peasants were ordered to get there and listen to Khrushchev. When Khrushchev began to talk the big crowd of, I don’t know how many times ten thousands or a hundred thousand, peasants could not be controlled.

They began to leave the place by the coaches, and big dust clouds showed a very brave and a very definite demonstration that “they could force us to appear here but they could not force us to listen to this tyrant of our nation.”

Khrushchev afterward acknowledged this event but did not tell anything. I believe on the basis that he realized the peasants are always the most embittered anti-Communists in these countries where their small lands were communized. Khrushchev did not care about this demonstration because those were peasants, and he knew they did not like him.

Then next he was brought to Tata. It is a big mining area. The Communists always boasted that the miners and the steelworkers of heavy industry “are the backbone of the Communist system.”

They brought Khrushchev to this mining area to show that “if the peasants did not like you, these are your real comrades and they will applaud and acclaim you.”

There the miners also could be forced to get to the spot and begin to listen to Mr. Khrushchev, but very soon they began to leave the place in high numbers, in big groups. Then Khrushchev lost his temper, because his greatest hope faded away. Even the miners of Hungary refused to listen to him. He shouted the following—and I have a note. If I am allowed I will quote that, mentioning the Communist source of Budapest. When these miners left the place in big numbers, in great groups, Khrushchev—very irritated—shouted after those who left the place—and I quote word for word:

Your demonstration is in vain. You have to swallow the fact: What is to be will be.

It was written in the Hungarian Communist newspaper Népszabadsag and announced by Budapest radio on April 10th, 1958.

It means that the Communist newspaper and the Communist radio had to recognize the fact: the miners, who were believed to be the backbone of the Communist Party and Communist system, were brave enough to demonstrate: “We do not want to listen to that man who personally is responsible for the bloody suppression of the country.”

I believe if these suppressed people dare to demonstrate that they do not want this man, they do not want his system, they will not sympathize if they hear about a possible triumphant reception of this man anywhere in the free world.

Mr. Arens. Is peaceful coexistence with Khrushchev and the Kremlin and international communism possible?

General Kiraly. Sir, the “peaceful coexistence,” is as great a fraud as the whole diplomatic action was in Budapest in November 1956. The peaceful coexistence is a dreadful thing.

The peaceful coexistence means that one hundred million East Central European people will, against their own will, be forced to live in the Communist orbit.

Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence means that the status quo is recognized. The peaceful coexistence of Khrushchev does not intend peacefully to coexist, but does intend to have a direct or indirect recognition of the suppression of one hundred million westernized people from the Baltic down to Bulgaria and Albania.

I believe that even if after this recognition Khrushchev would be sincerely willing to coexist, even at that time it would be one of the most unjust situations because this system would recognize the suppression of one hundred million westernized people in the Soviet orbit.

Mr. Arens. Now, if in the next few weeks Khrushchev pledges to the West his peaceful intentions and pledges to the West that he does not want war, can we believe him?

General Kiraly. Such sort of announcement could only be believed if Khrushchev would allow the one hundred million westernized East Central European people to announce their own will.

Khrushchev would be obliged to let them choose the system they want to live in on the basis of the Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted in Yalta and the Peace Agreements of Paris after World War II. Under these agreements, all the East Central European people have the right to choose their own government by secret election. If Khrushchev wants something sincerely, he has to carry out at least the Yalta agreement. Afterward we will see what this one hundred million people wish. I know democracy is what they want.

Mr. Arens. General, were you a member of the Communist Party?

General Kiraly. Yes, I was.

Mr. Arens. What is the objective of the international Communist operation?

General Kiraly. One thing, sir—and this one thing never has been denied by the Communists—this simple announcement of Khrushchev, “We will bury you.” Or Khrushchev’s last announcement when he visited Eastern Germany. In Leipzig he made a big speech. Very clearly he announced that capitalism—as they are naming the West—will be ruined and communism has to overrule the globe.

This is a single thing. Out of it they never made any secret. They always announced it clearly: It is the aim of international communism to annihilate the freedom of the free world and to overrule the globe with the Communist system.

Mr. Arens. Is the international Communist empire now at war with the free world?

General Kiraly. Yes, they are in a continuous war in many, many fields. Not to mention the Asiatic developments now from the Indian border to Laos, but they are in war even in Europe. The radio broadcasts, the newspapers, all the international events like the youth festival in Vienna, were an effort to attack and to ruin the West.

But—thank God—many of my friends were, for example, in Vienna. That city, being a place outside the Iron Curtain area, the organizers of the festival could not suppress the freedom of speech. I can with a great responsibility announce that there in this battle, which was a battle of ideals, the Communists lost—not in the official meetings which were controlled by the Communist Party, but in the streets where they were debating centers, where free speech could not be controlled.

There, in front of the youth of uncommitted countries, freedom was what won. It was a battle, and such battles are occurring day to day on different fields.

Mr. Arens. General, are we engaged in a popularity contest with a competing economic system; or are we engaged in a death struggle with a world conspiracy which threatens freedom everywhere?

General Kiraly. We are in a death struggle against the greatest conspirator of mankind, and this struggle is going on day and night.

Mr. Arens. Earlier in your testimony, General, you mentioned the execution of Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter. Would you give us the details of that atrocity?

General Kiraly. According to a communiqué of the Hungarian Minister of Justice, the translation of which was reported by Reuters of June 17, 1958, Imre Nagy, Prime Minister of Hungary; General Pal Maleter, Defense Minister of Hungary; and their associates were tried and found guilty and executed.

These illegal executions were first announced by Moscow radio on June 16, 1958, and not by Budapest authorities which announced it only on June 17, 1958.

Only two months prior to these scandalous executions, Khrushchev spent one week in Budapest. The coincidence of the time of the possible trial and Khrushchev’s visit in Budapest indicates that he had a direct hand even in Imre Nagy’s execution.

The whole Imre Nagy case is a shocking phenomenon showing what the Khrushchevian treachery, relentlessness, and tyranny over individuals, as well as nations, means.

It is well known that after the second Soviet aggression on November 4th, 1956, Imre Nagy sought asylum in the Yugoslavian Embassy in Budapest. On November 22, 1956, after Janos Kadar, the Soviet-imposed Prime Minister of Hungary, stated in writing that the Hungarian regime did not want to start proceedings against Imre Nagy and his associates, Nagy and his party left the Yugoslav Embassy. After leaving the building they were kidnaped by Soviet military forces and deported to Rumania.

In a verbal note, the Yugoslav Government stated—and I quote—“There was a flagrant breach of the agreements reached.”

It is quoted from the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General Assembly, the 11th Session, Supplement No. 18 in 8 (A-3592) page 10.

Janos Kadar, the Soviet-imposed Prime Minister of Hungary, made the following statement in a radio speech shortly after the kidnaping of the group:

We have promised not to start any punitive proceedings against Imre Nagy and we shall keep our word.

This is quoted from Népszabadsag, November 27, 1956.

In spite of this statement Imre Nagy and his associates were executed.

Who commanded Janos Kadar to break his own promise? No one else other than Khrushchev. Furthermore Imre Nagy and his associates were in the hands of Khrushchev’s secret police, and not in the hands of Hungarian secret police, and they were confined outside of Hungary.

It is very probable that even the execution was carried out by Khrushchev’s mercenaries.

Mr. Arens. General, you have seen communism in action in the raw, with all its brutalities. Can you tell us if we can defeat this force in the world by exchanging ballet dancers with the Soviet Union?

General Kiraly. Never.

Mr. Arens. Can we defeat this monstrous tyranny by sending and exchanging art work?

General Kiraly. Art work? Never.

Mr. Arens. Will Khrushchev and his thirty-three million zealots change by an exchange of visits between our country and the Soviet Union by distinguished personages?

General Kiraly. Never. All of these actions are used to defraud, to cheat public opinion of the free world, to lull their vigilance, and, in the meantime, to make progress toward their principal goal to conquer the whole world.

Mr. Arens. Will the international Communist conspiracy have any intention of changing its strategy or its tactics of infiltration and subversion over the world when Khrushchev goes to Iowa to see some of our farms; and when he goes to New York City and meets with certain of the businessmen who will be wining and dining him?

General Kiraly. Never.

Mr. Arens. Will Khrushchev or his gang of international outlaws who are dripping in blood now change, General, after Khrushchev is received by the officialdom of this Nation, given its honors as a head of state?

General Kiraly. Never, because the Communist system could not change its principal tactics of terror, of continuous shakeups, of continuous explosions even inside their system and empire. If they would change either internationally or internally, their present method—if they were to give substantial freedom inside their own country, if they were to liberalize their system inside—it would, like it happened in Hungary, positively progress to full freedom, which they never can allow. Freedom and communism are diametrically opposite of each other.

***

The Chairman. Do you, Mr. Kovago, solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Kovago. I do.

Statement of Joseph Kovago

Mr. Arens. Please identify yourself by name, residence, and occupation.

Mr. Kovago. My name is Joseph Kovago, I am a resident of 219 Potomac Road, Fairfax, Wilmington, Delaware. My profession is that of mechanical engineer, and I am the former mayor of Budapest.

Mr. Arens. Are you also, Mr. Kovago, connected with the Assembly of Captive European Nations?

Mr. Kovago. Yes, sir. I am the vice-chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, and I am the vice-chairman of the Hungarian Committee in New York.

Mr. Arens. You have stated that you were formerly mayor of Budapest. Would you kindly give us a very succinct résumé of your own personal background?

Mr. Kovago. I was born in 1913 in Csomoder, Hungary.

Finishing my elementary and high schools, I graduated from the Military Academy of Budapest. Then I served in the army as a young officer. Then I attended the Technical University of Budapest where I graduated in 1943 as a mechanical engineer.

In the last years of the war, we organized an anti-Nazi resistance movement of which I was one of the organizers. I was the first assistant to the leader of the anti-Nazi military movement, General Janos Kiss. We got arrested by Nazis, and my friends were executed. With the help of my friends who were not arrested I survived.

After the war I became a member of the Smallholders’ Party of Hungary, which was the largest party in opposition before the war and during the Nazi times. It was a democratic, anti-Communist party.

On the ticket of the Smallholders’ Party I was first appointed to be vice-mayor of Budapest, and serving in this office there came the free election of the Budapest city council where I was elected the mayor of Budapest in 1945, November.

I served in my office from that time on until 1947, June, when political events forced me to resign from my office.

Mr. Arens. What were the political events, if you do not mind an interruption at the moment?

Mr. Kovago. The Communist Party attacked our party; and though we gained in a free election in 1945 the absolute majority of the votes, we could not carry out our program, we could not govern the country because the Communist Party with the help of occupying Soviet forces prevented us from carrying out our programs, and forced our party to form a coalition government, in which the Communist Party was included.

At the beginning of 1947 the secretary general of my party, Bela Kovacs, one of the most respected leaders of our country, was arrested by Soviet troops, opposing communism and the Communist takeover.

Later on other members of the party were arrested also; and the prime minister, Mr. Ferenc Nagy, and the speaker of parliament, Monsignor Bela Varga, were compelled to escape the country.

I considered this to be a virtual takeover by the Communists and I resigned from my office, sending a letter to the city council in which I frankly declared that I fullheartedly disagreed with the present political situation.

Mr. Arens. What happened then, sir?

Mr. Kovago. Then I did not take part any more in the political life of the country, but worked as a mechanical engineer in different jobs.

In 1950, I was arrested by the Communist secret police, and after six months of having been tortured and questioned, I was put on a secret trial and got a lifetime sentence. I was accused of having built political, economic, and cultural relations with the West.

I spent six and a half years in different prisons; and just before the revolution, I was released on September 18th, 1956, on a parolee status for a half year on the condition that a new trial will take place.

Then came the revolution, in which—as it is a well-known fact—the whole Hungarian people took part. I helped to reorganize my party. I was elected a member of the executive committee of my party, later on the secretary general of my party.

I was reelected as mayor of Budapest on November 2nd, 1956, and I was appointed by Imre Nagy’s government to be the member of a five-member delegation which had the duty to carry out political discussions in connection with Hungary’s new international political status with the Soviet Union and, if necessary, with other powers.

When the second Russian intervention took place, I still remained in the country and took part in the resistance. That was a desperate struggle which we carried on. But on November 30th, 1956, I saw that my life was again in utmost danger; I would be grabbed again and put back in prison. I escaped the country with my family.

Then I visited European cities: Vienna, The Hague, Paris, London. Then on January 20th, 1957, I came to this country and from that time on I am living here.

Mr. Arens. General Kiraly has detailed in his testimony today the events of the Hungarian revolution. We should like to avoid an unnecessary duplication of the testimony, but there are a number of items we would like to explore with you please, sir.

First of all, based upon your experience in the revolution and as an authority in Hungary as mayor of Budapest, are you equipped to assess the responsibility for the crimes committed by the Communists in Hungary?

Mr. Kovago. First of all, the crimes began just after the Second World War. The Hungarian nation never was Communist and never had been Communist but the Communist Party, being a handful, a small minority, carried out a takeover by the help of the Russian army.

During this fight many good Hungarians were executed, killed, and deported to Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

This crime against the Hungarian nation was carried on during the later years, and it is a well-known fact that that was a terrible terror in the country during which time, again new Hungarian patriots went to the gallows.

We all experienced personally the tortures and the cruel methods which were applied against each Hungarian patriot who opposed the Communist regime.

This terror and this murder of the nation made the hearts of the Hungarian patriots full of despair and dissatisfaction, and that was the mainspring of the Hungarian revolution.

And then from the time that Khrushchev came into power, he is the man responsible for all the mass murders and tortures of the Hungarian men, women, and children.

Mr. Arens. During the intervention by the Soviet troops, did they confine their military activities to military targets?

Mr. Kovago. No, sir. They, the Soviet troops, invaded Budapest, and I am an eyewitness who saw with my own eyes that these tanks turned into streets where there were just apartment houses and nothing else. And these tanks shot against these apartment houses, and a considerable part of Budapest became in ruins.

There were killed children, women, young and old men without distinction, whether or not they were freedom fighters.

Mr. Arens. What will be the reaction in Hungary when the Hungarian people read about Khrushchev’s reception in the United States—how he will be wined and dined by our officialdom?

Mr. Kovago. The first question which comes to the mind of Hungarian people is: How it is possible that this butcher of Budapest and Hungary is coming to the greatest free country of the world.

Mr. Arens. Can you explain why Khrushchev had Imre Nagy executed and favored Janos Kadar?

Mr. Kovago. That is a very interesting and very enlightening problem, because both Janos Kadar and Imre Nagy took part in the revolution. At the beginning of the revolution, for about six days, Janos Kadar himself was an active participant in the Hungarian revolution because he became fully aware of the true sentiments of despair of the people.

Imre Nagy was killed and murdered on Khrushchev’s order because Nagy refused to subordinate the Hungarian interest to that of the Soviet Union. He refused to pledge loyalty to the Soviet Union while Janos Kadar pledged loyalty to the Soviet Union, and in this way he became the new puppet of Khrushchev in Hungary. This man carried out all the orders of Khrushchev, never hesitated to take part in this great crime against the peace-loving and heroic Hungarian people.

Mr. Arens. Did you have occasion to participate in any of the conferences following the actual shootings in which you observed the treachery of the Communists?

Mr. Kovago. I will be able to complete a little bit the description which General Kiraly gave quite clearly with the following:

I was present in the Parliament Building and I had a conference with Zoltan Tildy, Minister of State of the Imre Nagy government, and other members of the government, on October 31, 1956, when there came a telephone call from Mikoyan, the first assistant of Khrushchev.

Mikoyan wanted to have a conference with Zoltan Tildy. Before Zoltan Tildy left for that conference, we talked details over, all the problems which we had to raise before Mikoyan during the conference. These were the following:

• The immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary;
• Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact which we had already declared;
• The re-establishment of the multi-party system in Hungary;
• Preparations for a free election and re-establishment of the complete sovereignty and self-determination of the Hungarian peoples.

When Zoltan Tildy returned from an one-hour long conference with Mikoyan, he told me with a happy and smiling face: “I raised all the problems and he agreed with everything.”

This shows that Mikoyan was sent by Khrushchev to Hungary to cheat the Hungarian Government and to prepare this trap and treachery, because from that time on the Hungarian revolutionary government has acted in the belief that we will be able to arrange and solve all matters with the Soviet Union in a peaceful way.

But the reason for this treacherous diplomacy was, as General Kiraly pointed out rightly, to lull our alertness and to prevent us from concentrating troops and take all the necessary steps to continue our fight.

We never could imagine that the official delegation, an official representative of a great power, would prepare a trap for arresting the official delegation of the Hungarian Government which started negotiations on the very initiative of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Arens. Based upon your background and experience, can the representatives of the United States of America negotiate with Khrushchev as they would with a man of good faith?

Mr. Kovago. This example shows in itself that we never can believe that Khrushchev is carrying on negotiations in good faith.

Mr. Arens. What do you think is the guiding political principle of Khrushchev?

Mr. Kovago. I think that Khrushchev is the best disciple of Machiavelli because if his own interest dictates it, he will kill; while he finds it useful, he will smile, will kiss children, will shake hands and show a good face.

Mr. Arens. Will he ever relinquish the objective which he announced of burying the free world?

Mr. Kovago. I do not think he will ever give up this idea and those tactics because his final goal is to deceive the free world in order to attain its gradual surrender.

Mr. Arens. Do you have information respecting the losses in the Hungarian revolution?

Mr. Kovago. Yes, sir.

During and after the revolution and freedom fight there were approximately 30,000 Hungarians killed by armed forces of Khrushchev. According to official reports 2,500 persons were executed; however, the victims of Khrushchev’s secret police are probably higher—12,000 persons were deported to the Soviet Union; hundreds of thousands of persons were imprisoned; 15,000 were confined to forced labor camps.

And finally Khrushchev ordered the re-establishment of concentration camps which were abolished before the revolution of 1956.

Mr. Arens. You have told us certain connections and sources of information which you presently have, Mr. Kovago. Kindly on the record give us a general résumé of the conditions now in Hungary.

Mr. Kovago. The Hungarian people are in an apathy of despair. The new wave of terror which took place in Hungary after the revolution is increasing, and the complete control by the Soviet Union of the country is so striking and so clear to every Hungarian that the people are gradually losing their hope of regaining freedom.

The prison camps are again full. The conditions are terrible. The secret police are again in action even if they are not so conspicuous today. And generally all the efforts for improvements which were carried on before the revolution have been gradually abolished under the regime of Janos Kadar.

Under these circumstances it is a real heroism to continue the resistance against this oppression.

Mr. Arens. How many of your compatriots have chosen to live elsewhere than under the “blessed regime” of the people’s republic which Khrushchev heads by a puppet in Hungary?

Mr. Kovago. After the revolution more than 200,000 Hungarians escaped the country.

Mr. Arens. If they were permitted to do so, how many of your compatriots would leave this “people’s paradise” of Khrushchev’s in Hungary?

Mr. Kovago. I am sure, sir, that if the people would be able to escape, then the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian people would not remain.

But a country must survive the greatest tragedies of history, and all the people cannot and should not escape.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for the splendid contribution which you have made today.

(Whereupon at 12 noon, September 10, 1959, the consultations were concluded.)